University of Tulsa College of Law

TU Law Digital Commons
Articles, Chapters in Books and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works

2014

The Heroic Corporation and First Amendment
Romanticism: A Response to Professors Redish
and Neuborne
Tamara R. Piety
University of Tulsa College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/fac_pub
Part of the First Amendment Commons
Recommended Citation
92 Texas Law Review See Also 181 (2014).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles, Chapters in Books
and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
daniel-bell@utulsa.edu.

Texas Law Review
See Also
Volume 92

Response
The Heroic Corporation and First Amendment
Romanticism: A Response to Professors Redish and
Neuborne
Tamara R. Piety*
“[T]here is only one thing in the world worse than being talked about,
and that is not being talked about.”1
When I saw that Martin Redish2 and Burt Neuborne3 had written reviews
of my book, Brandishing the First Amendment,4 for the Texas Law Review I
was both pleased and apprehensive. The apprehension is easy to understand.
As Professor Larry Kramer has observed, “Having one’s work closely
criticized is never pleasant: hugely complimentary, and oh-so-much better
than having it ignored, but still difficult and painful.”5 Thus, I approached
both reviews with some trepidation. On the one hand, it was a compliment to
be reviewed in such a prominent journal. On the other, I had little reason to

* Phyllis Hurley Frey Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. Thanks go to
Garrett Epps, Sam Halabi, Sandy Levinson, Steve Shiffrin, Bob Spoo and Gerald Torres for their
feedback and suggestions. Many thanks to Nicholas Bruno and the other editors of the Texas Law
Review for their excellent edits and their patience. This response is dedicated to the memory of one
of the most eminent First Amendment scholars of our time, the late C. Edwin Baker.
1. OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 10 (Start Publ’g 1993).
2. Martin H. Redish & Peter B. Siegal, Constitutional Adjudication, Free Expression, and the
Fashionable Art of Corporation Bashing, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 1447 (2013).
3. Burt Neuborne, Taking Hearers Seriously, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 1425 (2013).
4. TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN
AMERICA (2012).
5. Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387, 387 (2003).
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expect that a review from Redish would be anything but critical.6 I hoped for
something rather more positive from Neuborne. I was disappointed.
The reviewers and I obviously disagree on many points. If there were
no more to it than that, I would be content to agree to disagree. However,
since I think each review mischaracterizes or misunderstands one or more of
the arguments in my book, or raises some issues which require a response, I
want to offer some corrections and clarifications. I thank the Texas Law
Review for giving me the opportunity to do so, as well as to preview my
current work-in-progress, Paternalism and the Regulation of Commercial
Speech.7
I.

First Amendment Romance

Although the two reviews offer different criticisms of Brandishing the
First Amendment, they share a perspective grounded in the romantic tradition
of First Amendment absolutism.8 For Redish and Siegal, that romanticism is
reflected in a perhaps unwarranted faith that corporate and commercial
speech9 is invariably valuable to listeners (we know it is valuable to
speakers) and that corporate speakers are important “catalysts in the process
of self-realization” for the citizenry at large.10 To support this proposition
6. The book received some fairly good reviews, but none of them were in law reviews. See, e.g.,
Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Book Review: Brandishing the First Amendment: Commercial Expression in
America, by Tamara R. Piety, 89 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 737 (2012). The reviews on
Amazon are particularly gratifying since one was written by Steve Shiffrin, a prominent First
Amendment scholar. Steve Shiffrin, Consumer Review on BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA, Amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com/Brandishing-FirstAmendment-Commercial-Expression/dp/0472117920. For an example of a more critical review
which is nevertheless fair see Mark A. Graber, Brandishing the First Amendment: Commercial
Expression in America, by Tamara R. Piety, 2 AM. POL. THOUGHT 163 (2013).
7. Tamara R. Piety, Paternalism and the Regulation of Commercial Speech (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
8. See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245. For one of the most well-known expressions of this tradition, see ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM
FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2007). For a
critique see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1, 21 (1971) (“Any such reading is, of course, impossible.”). For a discussion of the romantic
tradition generally, see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND
ROMANCE (1990). And for a skeptical review of the First Amendment’s history, see DAVID M.
RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 1–9 (1997) (arguing that the traditional story
about the trajectory of the First Amendment obscures the often hostile reception early free speech
claims received and noting that some famous, landmark cases actually upheld restrictions, even as
the opinions proposed more expansive protection in theory).
9. Commercial and corporate speech are generally viewed as doctrinally distinct. And
technically they are. But in the book I argue that the corporate speech line of cases owes much to
the earlier decision to protect commercial speech and that the feedback loop between the two means
that the corporate speech cases, in particular Citizens United, have an impact on the commercial
speech doctrine. For these reasons I group them together in this response. The differences are
discussed at length in the book. See Piety, supra note 4, at 17–51.
10. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1463 (emphasis in original). Given recent history, I think
it requires a rather Panglossian view of the benefits of corporate and commercial speech to conclude
that robust First Amendment rights for commercial enterprises is in the public interest. In another

2014]

Response

183

they rely on that hoary old First Amendment chestnut, “the marketplace of
ideas.”11 In this view, more protection for speech is always better for
freedom. And if some speech is abusive, oppressive, intrusive or annoying,
the remedy is still more speech, not regulation. Thus, Redish and Siegal
applaud the Supreme Court’s embrace of more protection for corporate and
commercial speech because they see it as leading to an expansion of freedom
of speech generally.
Professor Neuborne, on the other hand, is less sanguine about the
benefits to the public of corporate political speech. He would restrict this
sort of speech. Yet he apparently does not see any connection between
protection for commercial speech (which he supports) and protection for
corporate political speech (which he does not). I argue they are connected
and that there is feedback dynamic between these concepts which, judging
from recent decisions, may raise the danger of a First Amendment defense to
commercial fraud or even to ordinary labeling, disclosure and truth-inadvertising regulations.
Moreover, Professor Neuborne reads into my critique of commercial
speech and my argument that it should not receive robust First Amendment
protection, evidence of the left’s abandonment of one of its core principles.
“[A]n expansive First Amendment was the darling of the American left,”12 he
writes. Now, he claims, many on the left are prepared to challenge “the very
notion that regulating speech is particularly antithetical to a free society.”13
He reads Brandishing the First Amendment as such a challenge. I do not
intend it to be. Rather, I argue in the book that commercial and corporate
speech are not “speech” in the First Amendment sense (or, at this point,
work, Redish has more modestly suggested that the public and private interests may merely
intersect rather than completely overlap. Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good
for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
235, 235–36 (1998).
11. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1453. The metaphor is typically used, as it is in Redish
and Siegal’s review, to suggest that more speech is invariably better and is more likely to lead to the
production of the best ideas. For a definitive refutation of that idea see Alvin I. Goldman & James
C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas, 2 LEGAL THEORY 1, 11–12 (1996) (proving
that the market-maximizes-truth-possession hypothesis is demonstrably false); see also Robert Post,
Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2360
(2000) (critiquing the tendency to take the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor too literally).
12. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1425.
13. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1432–33 & n. 34. For instance, he claims that some on the left
have rejected the notion of “free speech as a trumping value that overrides almost all good faith,
plausible efforts at government regulation.” Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1432 & n.34, citing Reza R.
Dibadj, The Political Economy of Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 913, 915 (2007) and Sylvia
A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV. 909, 912 (1992). I don’t think
either of these articles really support this characterization. These authors are carving out exceptions.
For better examples of work questioning some version of First Amendment absolutism more
generally, see J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375; Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play
in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic
Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983).
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ought not to be, since the Court has extended some protection to them) and
therefore the absence of First Amendment protection for these categories
does little or nothing to undermine a free society. To the contrary, I argue
that it is offering robust First Amendment protection to these categories of
speech that ultimately undermines a free society.
Finally, Neuborne also believes that my discussion of manipulation
techniques and the psychology of professional persuasion is evidence that I
do not give listeners enough credit and that I would support broadly
paternalistic interventions because I think consumers are weak14 He
misunderstands my argument. It is precisely because I do credit listeners
with autonomy that I argue they ought to be able to decide for themselves
which advertising messages they want to receive, and that they ought to have
the power to block advertising they do not wish to receive without triggering
any countervailing speaker interest in speaking which would otherwise forbid
them to exercise their autonomy in that way.
II. Redish and Siegal: The Heroic Corporate Speaker
The Redish and Siegal book review is only partially a review of
Brandishing the First Amendment. A substantial portion of it is devoted to
jousting with Professor Neuborne,15 and about a third of the review promotes
the authors’ own substantive project, which they describe as an attempt “to
fashion a coherent explanatory theory of constitutional adjudication in order
to understand this widespread systemic choice in favor of extending the overwhelming number of constitutional rights and protections to corporations.”16
To this end, Redish and Siegal present a picture of the corporation as
hero—a Hohfeldian17 plaintiff litigating on our collective behalf.18 They
argue that corporations “do and should possess First Amendment rights. . . .
because of the vital instrumental role which the corporation serves in
advancing the fundamental goals served by the First Amendment right of free
expression through the process of private litigation.”19 Corporations, they
14. Id. at 1439.
15. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1458–63 (most of this section discusses the authors’
disagreements with Neuborne).
16. Id. at 1450.
17. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE. L.J. 16 (1913).
18. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1467–72.
19. Id. at 1450 (emphasis added). Apparently, only corporate litigants serve this important role
of advancing our common goals through private litigation as Redish is not terribly enthusiastic
about class actions which serve a similar function. He does acknowledge that “[o]ne of us has
argued” that class actions “undermine[] democratic legitimacy.” Id at 1466 n.93 (citing Martin H.
Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private
Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 73); see also Martin H. Redish & Clifford
W. Berlow, The Class Action as Political Theory, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 753 (2007). In contrast,
Judge Richard Posner has suggested class actions have proven more effective than the FTC in
protecting consumer interests (although he believes the FTC nevertheless plays an important role in
consumer protection). Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72
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argue, act as “economically incentivized” private-attorneys-general to
vindicate First Amendment rights for us all.20 I am skeptical of this
proposition. Indeed, my skepticism about whether freedom for corporate and
commercial speech advances fundamental First Amendment goals is one of
the principal themes of Brandishing the First Amendment.
Redish and Siegal offer many criticisms of my book, but a major one is
that it is simply “corporation bashing.”21 But to illustrate this claim they
offer up strawmen. For example, Redish and Siegal imply that I would
challenge a corporation’s right to bring a lawsuit, declaring that “[o]ur
economy would no doubt quickly degenerate into a state of chaos if
corporations were denied the opportunity to vindicate their legal rights in
court.”22 This observation would be more germane if in the book I were
challenging this right. I do not.23 What I do dispute is whether commercial
and corporate speech ought to enjoy full First Amendment protection, a
proposition which is not so well settled as Redish and Siegal would like it to
be.
They also resort to some rather intemperate, or at least ungenerous,
characterizations. Despite being on opposite sides of the commercial speech
debate,24 I could have hoped for a more collegial tone. Instead, Redish and
ANTITRUST L.J. 761, 769–80 (2005). So, it is not clear why litigation by corporations as privateattorneys-general, benefits the public while class actions by consumers do not. From a democraticlegitimacy standpoint, class actions are arguably on firmer ground since the plaintiffs may also be
voters, while corporations are not.
20. Corporate litigants themselves have shown somewhat less enthusiasm for the privateattorney-general device, at least in the hands of consumers. See Brief for the Ass’n of National
Adver., Inc., et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3–4, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S.
654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 835112 (objecting to the private-attorney-general provision of
the California Unfair Competition and False Advertising laws involved). In 2004 Nike and its amici
got by ballot initiative what they could not get from the courts. The law was amended to remove the
private-attorney-general provision after a ballot initiative (Proposition 64), campaigned for heavily
by business on the grounds that it permitted fraudulent and extortionate law suits against small
businesses. Companies such as Philip Morris, Exxon, and State Farm combined to collectively
contribute millions of dollars to the Proposition 64 campaign. See Jacquetta Lannan, Note, Saving
17200: An Analysis of Proposition 64, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 451, 469 (2006). Nike itself
contributed $50,000. Id. Ten years on, it is not clear that Proposition 64 has deterred fraudulent
claims, but Lannan argues it has had a deleterious impact on consumer protection. Id. at 475–76.
21. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1457. As I observe in the book, much of the criticism of
corporate speech and of the influence of corporations on society has come from corporate
governance scholars or authors whose long careers in business suggest that their criticism cannot so
easily be dismissed as a product of “left-wing, corporation bashing.” PIETY, supra note 4, at 146 &
n.27.
22. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1449.
23. Moreover, with respect to the right to sue, we do not need to engage in parsing of the
meaning of the word “person” (or “citizen”) in general because there is a specific statutory grant of
rights in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012), which provides that “a corporation shall be deemed to be a
citizen” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction in federal court.
24. Although I fundamentally disagree with him, I give Redish full credit for having been the
principal architect of the commercial speech doctrine. See Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of
Freedom”? The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 21 & n.109 (2012). Its
subsequent expansion owes a great deal to Redish’s advocacy, both as a scholar and as an advocate.
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Siegal appear to “dismiss any disagreement as a product of bad faith or
intellectual weakness.”25 I am accused of engaging in “fashionable”26
corporation bashing, motivated by some unspecified “sociopolitical,”27
“reflex[ive]”28 opposition.29 They use inflammatory characterizations,
claiming my critique is marked by obsession,30 rage,31 and hatred.32 But,
perhaps most disappointingly, Redish and Siegal charge me with “a complete
lack of familiarity” with constitutional law and a failure to grasp “the broader
lens of constitutional theory,”33 as if my observations are outside the bounds
of acceptable constitutional discourse. Given that some of the most
distinguished constitutional scholars in the nation34 have made arguments
similar to mine, this charge seems unfair.
Apart from the overheated rhetoric, Redish and Siegal’s substantive
critiques appear as follows: (1) that for-profit corporations must, as a logical
matter, enjoy full First Amendment rights because corporations have been

Indeed, he has continued to push for an expansive read of the First Amendment past the point many
might deem advisable. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Michael J.T. Downey, Criminal Conspiracy
as Free Expression, 76 ALB. L. REV. 697 (2012—2013) (criminal conspiracy).
25. Kramer, supra note 5, at 387.
26. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1457. This allusion is in both the title of the review and in
the text. Id. (“In constitutional academic circles, corporation bashing has in recent years become a
very fashionable activity.”) (emphasis added). I would note that I have been writing on this topic in
much the same way long before it was “fashionable.”
27. Id. at 1464.
28. Id. at 1472.
29. Id. (“There appears to exist a post-Citizens United reflex among the uninformed and the
ideologically driven to assume that because corporations are not humans, they are—both legally and
metaphysically—incapable of asserting any constitutional right, much less the First Amendment
right of free expression.”) (first and second emphases added; third emphasis in original). This is a
technique Redish has employed before. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First
Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
67 (2007) (generally accusing opponents of being motivated by anti-capitalist ideology and
“intuition”); Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech
Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553 (1997) (same).
30. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1467.
31. Id. at 1459 (“outrage”).
32. Id. at 1464 (“detests”); id. at 1458 (“contempt”).
33. Id. at 1448–49.
34. For example, the scholars criticizing Citizens United include: Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed.,
Conservatives Embrace Judicial Activism in Campaign Finance Ruling, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/22/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky22-2010jan22 (“[T]here is not the
slightest shred of evidence that the framers of the 1st Amendment meant to protect the rights of
corporations to spend money in election campaigns.”); David Kairys, Money Isn’t Speech and
Corporations Aren’t People, SLATE (Jan. 22, 2010, 6:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/01/money_isnt_speech_and_corporations_arent_people.html (contending that expansion of some constitutional rights to corporations does not necessarily include
speech rights); and Laurence H. Tribe, What Should Congress Do About Citizens United?,
SCOTUS BLOG (Jan. 24, 2010, 10:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/what-shouldcongress-do-about-citizens-united/ (arguing that corporations are using other people’s money when
they engage in political speech, those people have not necessarily authorized the speech, and there
are important differences between for-profits and not-for-profits in this context).
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granted other constitutional rights;35 (2) that my principal argument against
robust protection for commercial and corporate speech is that a corporation
lacks a “soul” and that this is an inappropriate criterion;36 (3) that regulation
of corporate and commercial speech, which I support, represents “viewpoint”
discrimination and that my support for regulation emanates from hostility to
capitalism or free enterprise;37 and (4) that my failure to articulate a theory
for why media companies can be distinguished from other for-profit
corporations dooms my thesis. I address each of these in turn.38
A. Logical Coherence
Redish and Siegal portray the extension of First Amendment rights to
corporations as speakers with distinct dignitary rights qua speakers as so
obvious, so well-settled, that only someone without a good “grasp” of the
broader sweep of constitutional law could be unaware of its existence and
sagacity. This is simply not true. As they later admit, this issue is not quite
so well-settled, or at least as explicitly articulated, as they wish it were.39
Nevertheless, they press the logical coherence argument: “[I]f no doubt exists
that corporations have standing to vindicate subconstitutional rights and
protections, how, purely as a logical matter, could they be categorically
denied the opportunity to invoke the nation’s highest law, the United States
Constitution?”40
What Redish and Siegal mean by “subconstitutional” is a bit ambiguous,
but if they mean to refer to rights created by statute, it is clear that the
creation of a statutory privilege does not necessarily convey constitutional
rights as well.41 Nevertheless, the authors imply that the extension of some
constitutional rights to corporations must necessarily include the extension of
all of them, except where it would be “incoherent”42 to do so, without saying
why this is not one of those places where it would be incoherent. Instead,
they resort to a sort of ipse dixit: “[I]t is far too late in the day to let the mere
fact of their corporate form categorically disqualify them from constitutional
protection.”43 “Most of the battles over the constitutional status of

35. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1457.
36. Id. at 1458–59.
37. Id. at 1463–65.
38. Id. at 1460–61.
39. Id. at 1452 n.25. This footnote essentially admits that their argument has not been explicitly
adopted by the Supreme Court.
40. Id. at 1449 (second emphasis added).
41. If it did, then it would seem that the declaration that a corporation is a “citizen” for purposes
of jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) would mean that corporations are citizens for purposes of
the interpretation of the word “citizen” everywhere in the Constitution. That is not the case, as
Redish and Siegal reluctantly admit..
42. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1449.
43. Id.
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corporations,” they write, “were long ago resolved in favor of allowing
corporations to invoke constitutional guarantees.”44
The key word here is “most.” Redish and Siegal know that it is not only
“conceivable”45 that a corporation might enjoy some constitutional rights
without enjoying all of them; it is the law.46 The issue is whether it is
coherent to extend full First Amendment protection to corporations and to
commercial speech. Brandishing the First Amendment is a book-length
argument that it is not. Redish and Siegal offer little by way of refutation of
the evidence I discuss.
B. The Corporation Has No “Soul”
Redish and Siegal’s second claim is that my opposition to robust
protection for commercial and corporate speech grows out of the observation
that a corporation has no “soul.” Although I use the famous observation that
corporations have “‘no body to kick or soul to be damned,’”47 I am not nearly
so concerned with the metaphysics of the corporate soul as I am with whether
protection of commercial or corporate speech is as beneficial to listeners as
its proponents claim, or whether protecting it promotes the values that the
First Amendment is commonly assumed to protect.
To be sure, one of the reasons for my argument that protection for this
speech does not advance these interests is that the corporation is just a legal
fiction—a tool—not a moral actor in its own right. That is not my only or
most important claim, but I should note that this argument has a respectable,
and, I might add, conservative, pedigree. As former Chief Justice Rehnquist
put it:
Although the Court has never explicitly recognized a corporation’s
right of commercial speech,48 such a right might be considered
necessarily incidental to the business of a commercial corporation. It
cannot be so readily concluded that the right of political expression is
equally necessary to carry out the functions of a corporation
organized for commercial purposes. A State grants to a business
44. Id. at 1448.
45. Id. at 1449.
46. They offer the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as “the exception that
proves the rule,” id. at 1457, as if this example stands in splendid isolation. Yet they then go on to
discuss at length another departure from this coherence model, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Redish and Siegal describe this line of cases as an “error” and exhort courts and
commentators to eschew “anachronistically textualist stances” in interpreting the Clause. Id. at
1452. I am at a loss to know what an “anachronistically textualist” interpretation is, but it sounds
suspiciously like they are urging the Court to reject the “plain meaning” or “original intent.”
Perhaps the Court similarly strayed from the coherence model in denying a corporation a personal
privacy exemption under The Freedom of Information Act. See FCC v. AT & T, Inc., 131 S. Ct.
1177 (2011).
47. PIETY, supra note 4, at 224.
48. Note that this dissent indicates that, at least as of 1978, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not
believe that Virginia Pharmacy had unmistakably conferred a First Amendment right on
commercial speakers.
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corporation the blessings of potentially perpetual life and limited
liability to enhance its efficiency as an economic entity. It might
reasonably be concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the
economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere.
Furthermore, it might be argued that liberties of political expression
are not at all necessary to effectuate the purposes for which States
permit commercial corporations to exist.49
If, as Justice Rehnquist suggested, expressive rights are not intrinsic to a forprofit corporation’s organizing purpose, it is arguably “incoherent” to extend
to it these expressive or dignitary rights.50 This is the opposite of Redish and
Siegal’s argument.
Many distinguished scholars have argued that the corporation lacks
status as a dignitary speaker.51 Indeed, this proposition is one locus of
Redish and Siegal’s disagreement with Professor Neuborne.52 And they
acknowledge that “scholarly criticism of the idea of corporate free speech
rights is not entirely new.”53 Indeed it is not. So the notion that this issue is
well-settled or must be the product of some sort of political hostility seems
like wishful thinking. I am not sure what critical mass of contrary opinion is
necessary before you can no longer claim that a viewpoint is completely out
of bounds of respectable constitutional discourse as opposed to one you
simply disagree with, but I think it has been reached here.
Redish and Siegal’s discussion of the corporate soul is simply an attempt
to compress a number of my arguments. In Brandishing the First
Amendment, I argue that protection of corporate political speech owes a great
deal to the earlier protection given to commercial speech,54 protection which

49. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 825–26 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). To be clear, in the above quote, Justice Rehnquist was playing devil’s advocate.
He did not agree with the decision to extend First Amendment protection to commercial speech
either. He also dissented in Virginia Pharmacy, observing that the decision “extends the protection
of that [the First] Amendment to purely commercial endeavors which its most vigorous champions
on this Court had thought to be beyond its pale.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). However valuable
the free flow of commercial information may be, Rehnquist thought the Virginia law was simply a
regulation of commerce and thus well within the powers of the state. Id. at 784 (“[T]here is certainly
nothing in the United States Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature to hew to the
teachings of Adam Smith in its legislative decisions regulating the pharmacy profession.”).
Rehnquist argued that the Virginia Pharmacy decision threatened to revive the discredited
substantive due process jurisprudence of the Lochner era. Id., citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726, 730 (1963).
50. See Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage in NonCommercial Speech?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379 (2006).
51. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1458 n.50 (citing C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989) and Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV.
735, 739 (1995)); see also Bennigson, supra note 51; Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech:
Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995 (1998).
52. See, e.g., Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1461–63.
53. Id. at 1458.
54. PIETY, supra note 4, at 22-30.
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was listener- not speaker-centric. The subsequent development of a
corporate political speech right dodged the hard question, which Justice
Rehnquist alluded to in the quote above, of whether political speech was a
necessary part of a for-profit corporation’s function. Instead of answering
that question, the Court (and many commentators) employed the listenercentric justification for protecting this speech without sufficient attention to
the question of whether the corporation as such, particularly the for-profit
corporation, ought to be viewed as a speaker possessing distinct expressive,
as opposed to economic, interests.
I argue that giving expressive rights to a legal fiction is a categorical
mistake.55 My argument is not simply that a corporation is not a human
being with expressive needs as a constitutive part of self (or, as Redish and
Siegal would have it, that the corporation has “no soul”56), but that there are
structural reasons to conclude that corporations “cannot be expected to
produce truthful or reliable information when it is not in their economic
interest to do so,”57 and that therefore, the assumption that robust First
Amendment protection for corporate and commercial expression will benefit
listeners or society generally is not well-founded. Instead, such robust
protection is likely to make it more difficult to regulate commercial
entities—whether by inhibiting the ability of the government to require
disclosures,58 warnings59 or otherwise provide consumers with information,60
or by inhibiting the government’s ability to punish or restrain false,
misleading, or otherwise injurious promotional speech and activities, whether
through regulatory actions or through private lawsuits. I also argue that if we
look at the practice of commercial and corporate speech, it does not appear
that granting expansive First Amendment protection to what is, particularly
with respect to commercial speech, essentially an artifact of commerce,61

55. Id. at 141–61.
56. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1458–59.
57. PIETY, supra note 4, at 161.
58. It is hard to keep up with the steady stream of First Amendment decisions on disclosures
emanating from the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n. of Mfrs. v. SEC, No 13-5252, (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 14, 2014) (holding SEC rule requiring disclosure of conflict minerals violates First
Amendment); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (striking down an
NLRB rule requiring employers to post information about the right to unionize).
59. For example, the FDA’s graphic warning labels on cigarettes were struck down by the D.C.
Circuit as compelled speech infringing on the tobacco companies’ First Amendment rights. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Interestingly, another court found
that another aspect of the new rules, that 50% of the package must be devoted to the warning, was
constitutional under Central Hudson. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. U.S., 674 F.3d 509,
530–31 (6th Cir. 2012).
60. After all, protecting consumers’ rights to receive truthful information was the rationale on
which commercial speech received First Amendment protection in the first place. See Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770–71 & n.24 (1976).
61. To quote Judge Richard Posner, “[i]t seems paradoxical . . . to allow virtually unlimited
regulation of the product . . . but to impose a constitutional obstacle . . . to the regulation of the sales
materials for it.” Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L.
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advances the interests the First Amendment is meant to protect. Indeed, such
protection may actually undermine those goals. Robust protection for
commercial speech appears to offer what Professor Tom McGarity has called
protection for the “freedom to harm.”62
In Brandishing the First Amendment I use Thomas Emerson’s survey of
the various theories for why a society might wish to protect freedom of
expression63 to ask if robust protection for corporate and commercial speech
appears to further any of these values. The four values in Emerson’s
framework are: (1) autonomy and self-fulfillment; (2) contribution to
knowledge (often invoked as the “marketplace of ideas”); (3) contribution to
democratic self-government; and (4) contribution to social stability.64
Drawing on evidence from work in a number of disciplines I conclude that,
for the most part, protecting corporate and commercial speech does not
further these goals. Where such speech can be said to contribute some public
benefit by, for example, offering consumers abundant choice with respect to
some consumer good or a rich trove of material which can be used for
consumers’ own expressive purposes,65 those benefits seem fairly modest
compared to the rather more obvious types of harm which, if such speech
does not cause, at least exacerbates—harms such as increased economic
instability,66 pollution,67 contribution to increased childhood obesity,68 and
disproportionate corporate influence in the democratic process.69 The book’s
REV. 1, 40 (1986). Posner argues it is “sensible from an economic standpoint” to offer less
constitutional protection to commercial advertising. Id. at 39.
62. See generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE
LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL (2013) (discussing how limited regulation allows corporations to act in
ways that harm the public).
63. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); Thomas I.
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963) [hereinafter
Emerson, Toward a General Theory]. Here I note that, contrary to Professor Neuborne’s assertion
that Emerson fails to include the argument that the special dangers of government censorship
warrant strong protection, see Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1437 n.54, Emerson actually spends a
good deal of time, in a couple of sections of his article, discussing this issue, Emerson, Toward a
General Theory, supra, at 887–96. As I read him, Emerson does not include the checking value of
the First Amendment in his catalog of positive values because he takes this aspect as a given,
perhaps because of the First Amendment’s wording as a negative restraint on government. For a
discussion of how the courts’ application of this consideration has been uneven and how the
checking value ought to receive more systematic and consistent consideration, see Vincent Blasi,
The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521.
64. Emerson, Toward a General Theory, supra note 64, at 878–79.
65. See PIETY, supra note 4, at 80 (observing that commercial speech can offer consumers
valuable information and may generally contribute to culture, but arguing the net effect is negative,
for reasons explored in the rest of the book).
66. Id. at 186–201 (discussing commercial and corporate speech’s contribution to economic
instability and boom/bust cycles in financial markets).
67. Id. at 202–22 (discussing commercial and corporate speech’s contribution to high levels of
consumption, which generate a great deal of waste).
68. Id. at 104–06 (noting its contribution to childhood obesity through marketing efforts to
children).
69. Id. at 165–85 (explaining its effects on the political process).
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argument relies on a great deal more than the question of the corporation as a
dignitary speaker, but Redish and Siegal ignore much of that material.
C. Viewpoint Discrimination
Redish and Siegal’s third claim is that to make a distinction between
corporations and human beings, or between commercial and non-commercial
speech, is a form of viewpoint discrimination.70 And they claim I am
motivated to engage in this viewpoint discrimination by my supposed
hostility to corporations or to free enterprise. But of course such “viewpoint
discrimination” was endorsed by that well-known enemy of free enterprise,
Chief Justice Rehnquist.71
As to the charge of viewpoint discrimination itself (independent of
motives), I submit that, by definition, the current commercial speech doctrine
is not neutral; it singles out commercial speech for different treatment than
other protected speech (at least in theory). So the viewpoint discrimination
claim does not work, at least with respect to commercial speech. More
fundamentally, I argue that there is no viewpoint discrimination in regulating
commercial (and corporate) speech because for-profit corporations do not
engage in promoting “viewpoints”; they promote the sales of their products
and services.
The entity itself is not alive and so doesn’t have opinions or viewpoints.
And the human beings who work for a corporation are agents.72 If there
happens to be a convergence between their personal views on, for instance,
the desirability of drinking Pepsi, that may be a happy accident or the
product of the psychological mechanism of motivated reasoning or cognitive
dissonance. But there is no necessary, or even likely, connection between the
two. When a salesman urges you to buy the vacuum cleaner he is selling he
may believe it is truly the best for your needs, or he may secretly believe it is
junk. But the sales pitch he makes is not a “viewpoint” unless “I hope you
buy my product” is a viewpoint. It is an action intended to generate a sale.73
And as an organization that is the whole of the organization’s viewpoint; it is
some variation on, “Buy our product!” “Our company is responsible!” “Our
company is a good investment!”
Commercial speech is an artifact of commerce, and its regulation is
necessary to effective regulation of commerce. And although corporate
70. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1463–65.
71. For a discussion of pro-business decisions made by the Rehnquist Court, see generally
Barbara K. Bucholtz, Destabilized Doctrine at the End of the Rehnquist Era and the Business
Related Cases in its Final Term, 41 TULSA L. REV. 219 (2005) (discussing numerous pro-freeenterprise decisions of the Rehnquist Court’s final term, as well as many other previous cases that
held in favor of business interests).
72. Professor Greenwood has made this argument particularly forcefully. See Greenwood,
supra note 52, at 1061.
73. If we were thinking about it in evidence terms we might call it a verbal act. Verbal acts are
statements that are not hearsay because of their character as legally significant actions that happen
to take the form of words.
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political speech looks more “viewpoint-like,” I argue that appearances are
deceiving because even corporate political speech is essentially driven by the
same imperative, profit, not by the substantive issues. Much of what looks
like political speech by corporations – such as issue related advertising or the
discussion of labor practices – is really simply part of an integrated
marketing communications strategy and thus, at least arguably, should be
regulable on the same terms its other promotional speech is regulable. The
reason the two categories—corporate and commercial speech—are today
doctrinally blurred is that the commercial speech doctrine, which located
protection for commercial speech in listeners’ interests, contributed to the
creation of the corporate-speech doctrine.74 Like in Virginia Pharmacy, in
Bellotti the Court relied on listeners’ interests to justify protection for
corporate political expression. 75 But the opinion also raised the viewpoint
discrimination argument, 76 despite not grappling, as Chief Justice Rehnquist
so keenly observed, with the question of whether a corporation can even be
said to have a “viewpoint,” let alone one that merited First Amendment
protection.
In Bellotti the Court suggested that distinctions between corporate and
other speakers were a sort of invidious discrimination. Justice Powell
writing for the majority observed:
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that
the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech
indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less
true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an
individual.77
This sounds as if the Court is saying that the corporation’s speech is
protected not because it is valuable to the listener, but because it is an
intrinsic right of the speaker. Yet it did not expressly say the corporation’s
speech was protected for its own sake. This viewpoint discrimination trope
reflected in this much quoted passage becomes quite problematic when it is
applied to commercial speech. And although the commercial speech doctrine
focuses on listener, not speaker interests this viewpoint discrimination trope
has migrated back to the commercial speech doctrine.78 Thus, advocates like
74. The connections between the two are described at length in the book. See PIETY, supra note
4 at 17–30.
75. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
76. Id. at 777 (“The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or
individual.”) (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. In at least one case a court has explicitly held that “business entities . . . are a species of
associations of citizens entitled to constitutional protection as citizens” and that a law which applied
only to certain businesses violated the Equal Protection Clause by “fencing out” “lawful businesses
that are otherwise entitled to the same protections of law as other citizens.” Noel v. Board of
Election Commissioners, No. 1422-CC00249, slip op. at 15–16 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Mo. Feb. 11, 2014).
The measure in question was a ballot initiative which sought to bar the City of St. Louis from
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Professor Redish argue that regulating commercial speech more heavily than
other protected speech constitutes viewpoint discrimination.
However, as Professor Neuborne has noted, the commercial speech
doctrine did not include a notion of a dignitary speaker.79 Yet the viewpoint
discrimination argument seems to assume such a dignitary speaker. Without
such a dignitary speaker, it is much more difficult to see why corporate or
commercial speech must be protected because if protection for it rests solely
on the benefit to listeners, then it should be unproblematic to deny protection
where any benefit to listeners outweighs the harms such speech may entail.
It strains credulity to suppose that everything for-profit corporations wish to
say (and perhaps more to the point, much they do not want to say) is in the
listeners’ interest to hear or that the public even wants to hear it. Very often
the public most definitely does not want to hear what advertisers wish to
say.80
Of course, if there is a dignitary speaker, that changes the calculus.
When the speaker himself has an expressive interest that the law respects the
First Amendment provides that he must not be unreasonably censored and
strict scrutiny applies. Respect for the equal dignity of persons compels this
result. But there is no such theory of the equal dignity of legal fictions.
Corporations are creatures of law. It is perfectly appropriate to condition
their privileges and powers by virtue of the terms governing their creation.
Different types of corporations receive different tax treatment. Companies
organized to conduct specific types of business, such as banking or public
utilities, are subject to different regulations than the producers of ordinary
consumer goods. There is nothing particularly sinister or discriminatory
about such distinctions. That does not change because the distinctions relate
to speech.
D. Media Corporations
Finally, Redish and Siegal claim my arguments are unconvincing
because I do not distinguish between media corporations and other for-profit

granting financial incentives to any “Unsustainable Energy Producer,” as defined in the proposal, as
part of a Sustainable Energy Plan. The judge granted a preliminary injunction against putting the
proposal on the ballot because (among other things) he found “[t]he measure is quintessentially
indistinguishable from the Colorado measure struck down in [Romer v.] Evans.” Id. at 16 (emphasis
added) (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (attempt to prelude legislature from passing
laws which would forbid discrimination against homosexuals violated Equal Protection).
79. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1442 & n.80.
80. See Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1151, 1152–53
(“Consumers hate spam. They hate pop-up ads, junk faxes, and telemarketing. Pick any marketing
method, and consumers probably say they hate it. In extreme cases, unwanted marketing can cause
consumers to experience ‘spam rage.’”). Goldman argues consumers don’t always appreciate the
value of marketing, and he makes an argument for robust protection for commercial speech despite
this consumer dislike. In my work-in-progress, Paternalism and the Regulation of Commercial
Speech, I argue that it is this kind of argument that is paternalistic and does not respect consumers’
autonomy. Piety, supra note 7.
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corporations.81 It is true that I do not discuss that distinction in the book,
although I have discussed it elsewhere.82 As they know,83 however, this
argument has been extensively articulated by others, in particular by
Professor Ed Baker.84 So it is not as if there is no basis for concluding that
such a distinction can be made. Since the treatment of the press clause would
be the subject for another book, I never intended to provide a full answer to
this question in Brandishing the First Amendment. (Even if I had, I am not
sure Redish and Siegal would have liked my book any better.) But given that
I was writing the book for a general audience and that this question is bound
to occur to even the casual reader, I did intend allude to it. Somewhere in the
many revisions the reference was apparently cut. I regret that omission. I will
try to correct it very briefly here so it is clear why I do not think the objection
about media corporations is fatal to my argument.
The press plays a distinctive role in checking government power and
orthodoxy.85 This role justifies distinctive treatment of press corporations,
despite their status as profit-making organizations. Moreover, the existence
of a separate press clause lends textual support to the proposition that media
companies should be treated differently than other corporations. According
to the late Professor Baker, the special status of the press means that the press
may receive both more protection than other protected speakers and, in some
circumstances, less.86
It is true, however, that the Supreme Court has tended to collapse the
free speech and the free press clauses;87 although, once again, this issue is
perhaps not quite as well-settled as Redish and Siegal suggest. And one
problem with arguing that “the press is different” is that it is increasingly
difficult to distinguish between the press and other businesses. The
interpenetration of marketing with editorial content is increasingly erasing
what used to be the line between editorial and advertising content.88 And as

81. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1460–61.
82. Tamara R. Piety, Free Advertising: The Case for Public Relations as Commercial Speech,
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 367, 411 & n.248 (2006).
83. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1458 n.50 (citing BAKER, supra note 51).
84. Professor Baker makes this argument in several of his works, but the one that perhaps most
clearly addresses the question is C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause
Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955 (2007); see also BAKER, supra note 51, at 229–49. A
newer theory was recently offered by Professor Michael McConnell. Michael W. McConnell,
Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412 (2013).
85. See supra note 84. For an argument that the First Amendment more generally performs this
function, see Blasi, supra note 64.
86. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 84, at 956 (pointing out that the Supreme Court has provided a
“different protection for the press and for individuals, with the press sometimes receiving special
protections, but also with it sometimes being subject to regulations as structured enterprises that
could not be applied to individuals”).
87. See Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1451.
88. A recent article in The New York Times Style Magazine discusses Ferragamo, the shoe
brand, making several short films called “Walking Stories” to feature its shoes. Alainna Lexie
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Redish and Siegal note, some non-media companies have attempted to
become media companies.89 In general they haven’t been very successful,90
maybe because people don’t find feature length ads terribly interesting.
However, these sorts of attempts, along with phenomena like “native
advertising”91 and other stealth-marketing techniques,92 illustrate the
difficulty in making distinctions between media or press and other
corporations. Redish and Siegal do not make as much of this as they could.
However, the difficulty in distinguishing between editorial and promotional
content and why this difficulty is troubling are topics I do deal with quite a
bit in the book.93
That does not make the distinctions I propose to draw, between for-profit
and not-for-profit corporations, or (by implication here) between press and
non-press entities, any more fraught than many other legal line-drawing
exercises, such as the distinction between public and private,94 or between

Beddie, Rules of Style: Ferragamo’s New Leading Lady on Flying in Style and Dressing Like a
Star, T: N.Y. TIMES STYLE MAG. (Oct. 8, 2013, 3:03 PM), http://tmagazine.blogs.nytimes.com/201
3/10/08/rules-of-style. Interestingly, a critical turning point in this migration may have been when
The New York Times opened up space on its editorial page for “advertorials.” See, e.g., Clyde
Brown & Herbert Waltzer, Every Thursday: Advertorials by Mobil Oil on the Op-Ed Page of The
New York Times, 31 PUB. REL. REV. 197 (2005); Herbert Waltzer, Corporate Advocacy
Advertising and Political Influence, 14 PUB. REL. REV. 41 (1988); see also ROBERT L. KERR, THE
RIGHTS OF CORPORATE SPEECH: MOBIL OIL AND THE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE VOICE OF BIG
BUSINESS (2005).
89. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1460–61.
90. Budweiser launched a website called “Bud.TV” which was to provide nothing but native
advertising. See infra text accompanying note 91. The site was only up for a couple of years.
Chris Albrecht, R.I.P. Bud.tv, GIGAOM (Feb. 19, 2009, 7:55 AM), http://gigaom.com/2009/02/19/
rip-budtv. Also, recently, a feature-length film that included heavy product placement faltered rather
spectacularly, in part because of the lack of a coordinated artistic vision or control free from the
demands of the various brand managers involved. Jake Rossen, Placing Products? Try Casting
Them: The Rise and Fall of the Computer-Animated ‘Foodfight!’, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/movies/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-computeranimatedfoodfight.html. The GEICO insurance “caveman” ads spawned a short-lived sitcom on
ABC. Stuart Elliott, Gauging Viewer Tastes: A New Dose of Escapism, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2007,
http://www.nytimes
.com/2007/05/16/business/media/16adco.html. The critical reception was poor and the viewer
response dismal, and the show was pulled before all the episodes aired. See Wikipedia, Cavemen
(TV Series), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cavemen_%28TV_series%29 (last modified Mar. 23,
2014).
91. Native advertising is editorial content created by an advertiser for promotional purposes. It
is a version of sponsored content which is far more elaborate than mere product placement. For a
discussion of the issue and how it works at the Huffington Post, see Paige Cooperstein, Native
Advertising: How It Works at the Huffington Post, PBS, (Oct. 8, 2013),
http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2013/10/native-advertising-how-it-works-at-the-huffington-post.
92. PIETY, supra note 4, at 39–47; see also Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial
Integrity, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 83 (2006).
93. PIETY, supra note 4, at 39–45.
94. Martin H. Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power: Constitutional and
Political Implications, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 77, 78–79 (2010) (discussing the private/public
dichotomy).
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expert and non-expert opinion testimony.95 And, unless we can make some
of these distinctions, it seems that a good deal of the regulation of commerce
will be under a constitutional cloud. This is a key argument in my book
which Redish and Siegal finesse with the observation that commercial speech
is “a work in progress.”96
It was a similar observation that motivated me to write the book. I too
saw that the commercial speech doctrine was a doctrine in flux and that the
trend of that “progress” was away from intermediate scrutiny and the
justification on which the doctrine was based97 and toward this stealth
version of a dignitary speaker and strict scrutiny. I found this movement
troubling because it seemed to have the potential to destabilize many existing
regulatory regimes. The movement toward strict scrutiny allows the
commercial speech doctrine to be used as a weapon against regulation
generally. And the strong, anti-discrimination approach of the corporate
speech cases adds weight to that observation. Hence the book’s title,
“Brandishing the First Amendment.” I predicted we would see more cases of
the First Amendment being used as a weapon to challenge regulation. The
record bears out this prediction.
Since Citizens United there have been a flurry of cases raising First
Amendment challenges to a variety of legislation.98 This turn of events may
have troubling and unanticipated consequences; it may unsettle regulatory
regimes which have been uncontroversial for decades.99 And as Redish and
Siegal themselves note, “the government has not won a case challenging
suppression of commercial speech in the Supreme Court in over twenty
years.” Most recently, the Court has “at least implied that any regulatory
95. See FED. R. EVID. 701–702 and advisory committee’s notes.
96. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1462.
97. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770–71 & n.24
(1976) (noting that extending First Amendment protection to commercial speech did not prevent
proper regulation or suggest that it was “wholly undifferentiable” from other types of protected
speech).
98. This is by no means an exhaustive list, but some of these cases are IMS Health, Inc. v.
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (data mining statute violates First Amendment speech clause); R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (striking down FDA’s graphic
warning labels on cigarettes); Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n., 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011)
(striking down law regulating sale of violent video games to minors); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs v. NLRB,
717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (striking down NLRB rule declaring a failure to post a notice of
employee rights an “unfair labor practice”); Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL
1357041 (6th Cir. 2014) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to Ohio licensing requirement for
dealers in precious metals); Law School Admission Council, Inc. v. State, 166 Cal. Rptr3d 647 (Cal.
App. Dist. 2014) (rejecting First Amendment and Equal Protection challenges to law prohibiting the
LSAC from “flagging” LSAT scores of applicants who have taken the exam with accommodations).
99. PIETY, supra note 4, at 223; see also Tamara R. Piety, Citizens United and the Threat to the
Regulatory State, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16, 20–22 (2010),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/piety.pdf (offering a brief summary of the
potential for unintended consequences if the approach in the corporate political cases is exported to
the commercial speech context because of the likely higher standard of review and different
analytical foundation reflected in the former).
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distinction of expression premised on the commercial nature of the speaker
deserves strict scrutiny.”100
Thus, the “book’s principal policy recommendation [was] a conservative
one: do not extend strict scrutiny review to the commercial speech
doctrine.”101 In writing the book I wanted to urge courts to consider the
potential ramifications of robust First Amendment protection for commercial
speech102 because strict scrutiny review has troubling implications for the
government’s ability to regulate commerce. Yet Redish and Siegal have
almost nothing to say about this observation except to offer the non sequitur
that the “commercial speech doctrine is a work in progress.”103
III. Neuborne: The Romantic First Amendment
Neuborne, in contrast to Redish and Siegal, better addresses the
arguments I actually make in my book rather than a caricature of them—
while also being a more sympathetic interlocutor. But like Redish and
Siegal, his view of the First Amendment seems to be that if one supports
some regulation of speech, one must not be committed to freedom of speech
generally. This is not correct.
Neuborne’s review begins with a somewhat romantic narrative about the
emergence of the iconic First Amendment decisions followed by a story of
decay and disarray that I am not sure I agree with.104 On the whole, however,
there is much we agree on. The disagreements we have center on his
misunderstanding of my argument about what we should make of the
evidence of manipulation of consumers by advertisers. I argue that there is an
imbalance of power that justifies regulation, that the evidence of
manipulation demonstrates that commercial entities are using superior
resources to undermine consumer autonomy. Neuborne believes that my
support for regulation means that I don’t take consumers seriously, that I
would support paternalistic interventions. Neuborne also seems to reject my
claim that the application of the viewpoint-discrimination/strict-scrutiny
standard to commercial speech runs the risk of insulating false speech. I
discuss this issue first and then address his broader concern that I do not take
listeners’ interests seriously.

100. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1462.
101. PIETY, supra note 4, at 12.
102. On the one hand, the trend I identified has become further entrenched with Citizens United
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) and Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). On the
other, the unpopularity of at least the Citizens United decision has opened up some political space
for discussion of this issue. It has turned what previously may have been a minority viewpoint
among First Amendment scholars into one that, at least in its broadest outlines, is more mainstream.
See, e.g., Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV . 1153
(2012).
103. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1462.
104. Professor Neuborne’s story of this transformation begins with “Once upon a time” and
takes up the first 8 or 9 pages of his review. Id. at 1425–33.
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A. Blurring the Commercial/Corporate Speech Distinction
As a general matter, Neuborne’s review is a lament that Brandishing the
First Amendment is not the book he thinks I ought to have written, one which
would focus more on the dignitary speaker. He notes that protection for
commercial and corporate speech is founded on its benefit to listeners, not to
any dignitary rights of the commercial or corporate speaker105 and therefore
the Citizens United case represents a troubling development. I agree. The
critical mistake I believe Neuborne makes is when he says protection for
commercial and corporate speech is founded on “the dignitary and
instrumental rights of hearers to receive uncensored information.”106 This is
not correct. The commercial speech doctrine was predicated on the right of
consumers to receive truthful information, not “uncensored” information.
This distinction is very important.
The Virginia Pharmacy Court contemplated that its ruling would permit
quite a bit of censorship, if by “censorship” one means the government
suppressing false or misleading speech, requiring warnings or disclaimers, or
setting the terms and conditions for communications about certain types of
transactions, as with, for example, securities regulation.107 But the courts
have not traditionally viewed such regulation as censorship. Only recently
have advocates like Redish argued that ordinary commercial regulation of
commercial speech is a form of censorship.
The Central Hudson108 test provides that in order for commercial speech
to receive First Amendment protection, the speech must be about a lawful
product and must not be misleading.109 These limitations illustrate why the
importation to commercial speech of the viewpoint discrimination analysis
and strict scrutiny is so troubling. The viewpoint discrimination advocates
seem to want to elide these limitations on the protection for commercial
speech and suggest that all commercial speech is protected, including false
and misleading speech. But the doctrine explicitly excluded false and
misleading commercial speech, while traditional First Amendment doctrine

105. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1439.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)
(“Obviously, much commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly false, but only
deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle to a State’s dealing effectively with this
problem.”).
108. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv, Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
109. Id. at 566.
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protects a great deal of false speech, sometimes explicitly110 and sometimes
as a function of the strict scrutiny standard of review.111
This is not an appropriate standard to apply to commercial regulation. A
commercial entity will only have an interest in conveying truthful
information to consumers about its product if that truthful information will
help it sell the product. If it does not help to sell the product or, worse still,
depresses sales, the company will not only have no incentive to tell the truth,
it may have a legal duty to lie unless there is a legal compulsion to tell the
truth. 112
Neuborne doesn’t believe that regulation of false and misleading speech
is in any jeopardy because, he says, there is no dignitary speaker in the
commercial speech doctrine.113 While I agree there is no dignitary speaker in
the commercial speech doctrine, I am not so sanguine. While Professor
Neuborne may think “it would take an earthquake to move a majority of the
Court to recognize that false and misleading commercial speech is entitled to
full First Amendment protection”114 because “the Court would need an
entirely new rationale for such an expansion,”115 I argue116 that the Court has
in fact essentially already dispensed with the underlying rationale for
protecting commercial speech. It has already begun to treat commercial
speech as if it had a dignitary speaker.117
If I am correct, then it is not at all clear why, as Professor Neuborne
would have it,118 the recent decision in United States v. Alvarez119 which
protected false speech about military honors, has no bearing on commercial
speech.120 In fact, the Court has not used the dignitary speaker as a rationale
110. Recently, the Court struck down a statute which criminalized false claims of military
honors. Alvarez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). In so doing, the Court repudiated as mere
dicta the oft-stated observation that there is no First Amendment value in false speech as such. Id. at
2545 (“The Court has never endorsed the categorical rule the Government advances: that false
statements receive no First Amendment protection.”).
111. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (First Amendment requires
“breathing room” which includes protection for some falsity).
112. The national experience with tobacco being the most notorious example, illustrates the
truth of this observation. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, “Too Much Puff”: Persuasion, Paternalism,
and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1222–23 (1988) (stating that the tobacco
industry is “understandably motivated by enormous profits rather than by concern for truth or the
public welfare”).
113. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1442.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Piety, supra note 4.
117. On this point Redish and Siegal agree with me. They write that the commercial speech
doctrine appears to be subject to strict scrutiny review even if the Court hasn’t yet “explicitly taken
[that] step.” Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1462.
118. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1442.
119. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
120. In fact, a plaintiff in a commercial speech case has already cited Alvarez. See Petition for
Review, Law School Admission Council, Inc. v. State, 2014 WL 1053298, at *15 (Cal. 2014)
(appealing from Law School Admission Council, Inc. v. State, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 647 (2014) The
Court’s recent decision in the POM Wonderful case, although it did not involve a First Amendment
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in either the commercial or corporate speech decisions, relying instead on the
interests of listeners argument. If the absence of a dignitary speaker is
dispositive it should call into question the soundness of the decision to
extend constitutional protection to corporate political speech as well since, as
Neuborne observes, there is no dignitary speaker there either.121 But as we
know, it has not.
Yet the absence of a dignitary speaker in both doctrines go to the heart
of what is going on in commercial speech doctrine today. Resort to content
neutrality and listeners’ interests allow advocates to avoid acknowledging the
absence of a dignitary speaker and the meagerness of the corporation’s
dignitary interests (or lack thereof) in both the commercial and the corporate
context. It is a doctrinal sleight of hand which permits advocates of freedom
for both commercial and corporate speech to level charges of paternalism at
the advocates of regulation. It is only through construing commercial and
corporate speech as a benefit to hearers that the paternalism claim, which is
Professor Neuborne’s main concern, seems to have plausible analytical
coherence. Once we focus on the speaker’s interest we see that regulation of
commercial speech primarily imposes a restriction on speakers, not listeners.
And it restrains speakers, not for their own benefit (which would be
paternalistic), but for the listeners’ benefit (which is not). The restraint of
one person for the benefit of another person may or may not be justified, but
it is not “paternalistic”—at least not in the strictest sense.122 Yet it is an
objection to what he sees as paternalism that is at the heart of Neuborne’s
critique.
B.

Taking Hearers Seriously
As the title of his review suggests, Neuborne’s main objection to my
book is that, in his view, I don’t take hearers seriously. He claims I
“infantilize”123 listeners, that I am “condescending.”124 I disagree. He
mistakes my recognition of structural imbalances of power and time for
condescension. I will not fully elaborate the argument that I make in my next
article, Paternalism and the Regulation of Commercial Speech,125 but I want
to sketch out its basic parameters as a response to his book review.

challenge, suggests the Court may be willing to reaffirm its commitment to regulation of
commercial speech. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 81 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. June 12,
2014).
121. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1442. This is the subject of the dispute between himself and
Redish.
122. I am aware there are arguments that restricting one person’s liberty to benefit another
rather than the one so restricted is paternalistic, even though not classically so. I discuss this issue at
greater length in the paper. Piety, supra note 7. But the classic construction paternalism is the
restriction of someone’s liberty for his own good.
123. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1439.
124. Id. at 1438.
125. Piety, supra note 4.
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Characterizing consumers as condescended to if we recognize the
enormous structural (not intellectual) disadvantages they face when coping
with persuasion attempts by large, powerful companies is an argument
reminiscent of that advanced by Justice Peckham in Lochner. In reviewing
New York’s limitation on the hours worked by bakers, Peckham wrote:
There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in
intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual
occupations, or that they are not able to assert their rights and care for
themselves without the protecting arm of the State, interfering with
their independence of judgment and of action.126
This characterization erases the differences in power between employer and
employee. Neuborne likewise ignores the difference in power between
advertiser and consumer. He mistakes my critique of the advertisers’
exploitation for one about consumers’ intellectual capacities. Like Redish
and Siegal, Neuborne assumes that my use of the behavioral science and
marketing literature demonstrates that I believe consumers have no agency,
that they are no more than unwitting dupes, thus justifying “paternalistic”127
interventions. This critique is frustrating given that I went to some lengths in
the book to explain why I thought a great deal of regulation of commercial
speech is not paternalistic at all.
In Chapter 6 of Brandishing the First Amendment I argue that much
regulation of commercial speech, such as ad blocking or the Do-Not-Call
Registry, is intended to give consumers more control over the sales pitches
they receive or more control over their data or their privacy.128 Such
regulation is intended to expand consumers’ autonomy. Popular demand is
often the genesis for such regulation. It is not paternalistic to give citizens
the legislative relief they want. To the contrary, it is paternalistic to
disregard these preferences on the grounds that commercial speech offers
consumers some benefit that they do not fully appreciate,129 such as an
opportunity to learn self-discipline.130
It is the proposition that consumers cannot freely choose to cut off their
exposure to commercial messages because such exposure offers consumers
valuable learning opportunities that is paternalistic. This amounts to a
refusal to give consumers control over the degree to which they must be
subject to unwanted persuasion attempts, not for ideas, but for commercial

126. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (emphasis added).
127. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1471 (writing that I appear to embrace “governmental
paternalism”).
128. PIETY, supra note 4, at 107–20.
129. See generally Goldman, supra note 80.
130. See, e.g., MARK D. WHITE, THE MANIPULATION OF CHOICE: ETHICS AND LIBERTARIAN
PATERNALISM 125 (2013) (arguing that regulation may prevent consumers from having educational
experiences); Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral
and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1630–31 (2006) (arguing that regulation may
prevent consumers from learning self-control). I call this “tough love” paternalism.

2014]

Response

203

products and services, on the grounds that consumers are bad judges of what
is good for them. That sounds fairly paternalistic. And it forces consumers
to serve as a resource for advertisers. (They call it data “mining” for a
reason.)
It is precisely because I credit listeners with the autonomy to make these
decisions that I argue that listener autonomy ought to extend to the ability to
cut off commercial appeals altogether or to otherwise control them in some
way. In the political and social realm there is some force to the notion that
we ought not to be able to shield ourselves completely from opposing points
of view, if only so we can be forced to think more deeply about our own
position. The idea is that it is good for us to be exposed to the ideas we
hate.131 Moreover, speaking has expressive value for the human being who
wishes to speak and who would be silenced that justifies protection, quite
apart from whether it has any value to any listener, anywhere.
There is no such countervailing social good that comes from forcing
people to hear commercial pitches they do not want to hear. It strains
credulity to suggest we must be exposed to commercial messages for
products we don’t want to advance the common good. Indeed, there is a
compelling case to be made that there are very many harms that can emerge
from it. I talk about some of them in the book—rising childhood obesity,
environmental harms from high levels of consumption, and economic
instability.132
Professor Neuborne is concerned that all of the psychological tricks and
fallibilities of mass communication are present with political speech as well
as commercial and, thus, it is unclear why we should not likewise intervene
to test political speech for its truth.133 However, because political speech is
inevitably tied up with party politics, it is reasonable to conclude we could
never trust a Federal Political Truth Commission to police the truth of
political speech the way we may (hope) for an agency like the Federal Trade
Commission to police the truth of private companies’ promotional sales
claims.134 Truth tests in political speech would invade matters less capable of
factual resolution than those in commercial speech. And political issues
involve both substantial moral values and the democratic process. Truth-inlabeling seems to implicate less transcendent concerns.

131. See generally LEWIS, supra note 8.
132. There are others I don’t talk about in the book but which I have addressed elsewhere, like
harms to women in reinforcing anxiety about appearance or gender stereotypes. See, e.g., Tamara
R. Piety, Onslaught: Commercial Speech and Gender Inequality, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 47
(2009).
133. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1438. But see Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, ___U.S.
___, No 13-193, slip op. (June 16, 2014) (plaintiff may go forward with challenge to Ohio law
prohibiting false statements in “attack ads” shortly before an election).
134. For an argument that would seem to support this view, see Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s
Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109
(1993).
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Moreover, Congress’s power to regulate commerce seems to compel the
conclusion that commerce, if not totally separate from politics, must be
analytically distinct in a way that makes regulating it possible and not just
politics by other means. In any event, the separation between economic
activity and political activity, while somewhat artificial once money is
deemed speech, is a divide that has been taken for granted for almost 200
years in our constitutional jurisprudence135 So it is hard to argue that it is
impossible to police.
Also, as to political speech, there is an argument that the First
Amendment is needed primarily to protect the dissident and the powerless136
and to allow people to make up their own minds.137 However, major
business corporations are not powerless dissidents. Indeed, it is not an
uncontroversial proposition that they are even legitimate players in the
democratic process. Many argue they have far too much influence in public
affairs relative to the representativeness of their views. As Justice Marshall
noted in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,138 “[t]he resources
in the treasury of a business corporation . . . are not an indication of popular
support for the corporation’s political ideas.”139 Finally, simply saying a
corporation’s speech is not entitled to constitutional protection is not the
same thing as prohibiting it altogether. It may still be protected by statute
where appropriate. What is at issue here is whether the people may use the
political process to restrain private power.
Professor Neuborne accuses me of not taking listeners seriously, of
endorsing excessive paternalism. Yet he appears to embrace the notion that
everything the corporate speaker wishes to say in aid of selling its product is
something that the listeners are necessarily interested in (or ought to be
interested in) hearing, whether they know it or not and on this basis it must
be protected from their illiberal impulses It is this argument that I propose is
both deeply paternalistic and undemocratic. It deprives the people of the
opportunity to use the political process to restrain private power.
To deny them this power turns them into a resource for marketers, one
that can be mined just like coal or oil and that gives consumers little
autonomy over their own lives. I discuss this argument in more detail in
Paternalism and the Regulation of Commercial Speech. I do not anticipate it
will meet with Professor Redish’s approval, but I cherish the hope that it
might as yet be more persuasive for Professor Neuborne.

135. PIETY, supra note 4, at 1, 78–79.
136. Emerson actually discusses these ideas throughout, but a few examples can be found in
Emerson, Toward a General Theory, supra note 64, at 885, 890–98, 951.
137. Again, this element is discussed extensively throughout. See id. at 881–82.
138. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
139. Id. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986)).

